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Introduction
Many private child welfare organizations are contracted with state organizations to
provide services to children and families in need; some of these contracts are performance based.
Performance based contracting allows for more oversight and scrutiny from public organizations
and focuses on outcomes determined by performance indicators.
In the past, private child welfare organizations were granted contracts year after year
despite their performance. Specifically residential treatment facilities, facilities who offer twenty
four hour services to abused/neglected children and adolescents, anticipated yearly contract
renewal by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) unless they were
highly negligent.
In 2007, the National Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare
Services chose Illinois as a demonstration site to evaluate performance-based contracting in
residential treatment. The National Quality Improvement Center was created in 2001by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' Children's Bureau to assess privatization through
research and evaluation, facilitate dialogue between child welfare stakeholders, and promote the
expansion of evidence based practices (Collins-Camargo, Ensign, & Flaherty, p. 72).
Prior to 2007, residential contracts were considered purchase of service, services
purchased from private child welfare agencies by the government. Each agency was assigned a
daily rate of pay per client and an agency’s revenue was based on the number of days DCFS
clients were in placement. Performance based contracting guarantees agencies fixed revenue by
allowing DCFS to purchase a number of beds in residential treatment. Agencies are paid for the
number of contract beds regardless of the number of clients in treatment.
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Of course, a fixed revenue source is a huge benefit for non-profit organizations or any
organization for that matter, but there are other effects, some potentially negative effects, of
performance based contracting. Nine professionals who were directly involved with their
organization’s residential performance based contract (a clinical director, a treatment director,
two treatment supervisors, an executive director, a chief executive officer, an aftercare
coordinator, a manager of residential services, and a residential coordinator) were interviewed to
evaluate how their agency has been affected by the change to performance based contracting.
This paper will explore fiscal, program, and personnel effects of performance based contracting
through a case study approach. As a professional who has worked in the field of child welfare
for seventeen years, I expected predominantly negative effects reported during the interview
process. In my experience, private agencies have difficulty adjusting and accepting change
implemented by DCFS.
The study also reviews the principals behind performance based contracting and its
framework for effectiveness. It specifically examines Illinois’ Striving for Excellence Project
implemented by the Department of Children and Family Services in 2007. The paper concludes
by suggesting further research topics on the subject of performance based contracting.
Residential Care and Performance Based Contracting
Residential care in Illinois has taken many twists and turns over the years regarding need
and programming. Residential care is significantly lower in census than in the past. The state
has taken many strides to keep youth from entering residential care out of fear of
institutionalization. Currently there are approximately 1,400 youth in residential care in Illinois.
At one point within the last 15 years, there was over 4,000 youth in residential care (T. Duff,
personal communication, February 20, 2012). As of now, the state has reserved the most

3

challenging youth for residential. These are youth who have not been successful in alternative
forms of placement (home of relative, foster care). These youth have struggled with managing
their own behavior, understanding mental illness, and do not have stable family systems. The
residential facilities that work with these youth offer structure and consistency through
therapeutic means. This consists of weekly individual and group therapy, behavior management
systems and a milieu that offers structure and consistency on a daily basis. In the state of
Illinois, the majority of these facilities are private nonprofit, contracted by the state to offer these
services to wards of the state or court.
There are different tiers or levels of residential care in the state. These levels of care for
residential treatment are based on severity of the youth (type of mental illness, IQ scores,
physical aggression, legal involvement, etc) that are served within that particular agency. One of
the main differences between the levels of care are staff to youth ratio. Facilities that serve
higher end youth will have a smaller staff to youth ratio (1:3).
In times of fiscal struggle the state of Illinois, as well as the rest of the U.S., seeks to be
assured that the entities that have been entrusted with contracts to perform services are actually
meeting standards and can be measured in an objective and fair manner. Performance based
contracting is also meant to help the state provide consistency across the board in the vision and
standards of residential care. Before the implementation of performance measures, many
different agencies measured success on their own program models, which may have been
different than what the state expected. Performance based contracting allows the state to have
input on how success is measured; however it still allows private agencies to have creativity in
their program design to meet the expectations.
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In 1991, the U.S. Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and
Budget introduced the concept of performance based contracting with regard to service
contracting. Although the states were slower to implement the concept, by the late 1990’s some
states were mandating the use of performance based contracts for purchased services. Since that
time, performance based contracting has become more prevalent in child welfare in Illinois,
making it a more competitive arena (McCullough, C., Pindus, N., & Lee, E. 2008, p. 2).
In 1997, DCFS began to utilize performance based contracting in the foster care system
to incentivize permanency outcomes for clients. The hope was to reduce the number of youth in
out of home placements. Reports indicate that in 1997, at the contract’s inception, there were
more than 51,331youth in out of home care and in 2009 there were approximately 16,000.
Although there has been no empirical research done on the implementation of performance based
contracting in foster care, it’s implementation was largely credited to the reduction of youth in
out of home placements (Kearney, McEwen, Bloom-Ellis, and Jordan, 2010, p. 40).
Through performance based contracting, private agencies are granted government
contracts based on their past performance as defined by performance measures. Performance
based contracting, a practice of managed care, is defined by Lawrence Martin (2003) as
contracting that “focuses on the outputs, quality, and outcomes of the service provision and may
tie at least a portion of a contractor’s payment as well as any contract extension or renewal to
their achievement” (http://www.dshs.wa.gov/pdf/ca/CaseyFamilyPBCreview.pdf). Performance
based contracting focuses less on how the work is performed and more on results related to
outcomes, output, and quality. It utilizes measureable performance standards with clearly
defined objectives and timeframes. These measures could include number of successful
discharges; number of clients served; client employment; client education status, etc.
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Performance measures will differ from contract to contract depending on the program goals and
objectives. In some cases, agencies may receive fiscal incentives or penalties during the course
of the contract based on their progress toward achieving performance goals. Unfortunately,
during times of budget restraints, fiscal incentives are often eliminated and the only incentive is
contract renewal.
Not only do performance measures differ from contract to contract, but the quality of
contracts also vary. Poorly defined outcomes and performance measures place private agencies
at a financial risk. Those who write the contracts should be well versed on not only contract
preparation, but also the purchased services in order to establish performance criteria. Ideally,
the contracting agency and the private agency should collaborate on contract details.
Fortunately, for private residential providers in Illinois, more than 75 meetings were held
between the Department of Children and Family Services and service providers during the first
year of performance based contract development, but even then, ongoing clarification was
needed to guarantee success (McCullough et al., 2008, p.3-4).
The idea of paying for outcomes rather than services is not new to the public or private
sector, but according to Dr. Fred Wulczyn (2005), all systems, which utilize performance based
contracting, should address the following questions:
•

What is the target performance?

•

Will savings be reinvested?

•

What is the performance baseline and is it risk adjusted?

•

How will risk sharing be managed?

•

How will revenue be disbursed?
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•

Will there be upfront investment to stimulate improvements?
(http://www.ffta.org/publicpolicy_advocacy/pbcpaper.pdf).
In 2007, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services launched its Striving

for Excellence Project in response to the challenges of residential treatment for children and
adolescents. These challenges include concomitant medical problems, chronic mental illness,
pregnant and parenting youth with behavioral health challenges, youth with dual diagnoses for
mental illness and developmental disabilities, chronic runaways, and chronic psychiatric
hospitalizations. Youth placed in residential treatment are more likely to have histories of
substance abuse, criminal activity, sexual offending, suicidal ideation, prior psychiatric
hospitalizations, and psychotropic medication use. In order to address these challenges, the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services began to facilitate performance based
contracting (Kearney et al., 2010, p. 41).
At the inception of the project, a core principle was to allow input from all stakeholders
to increase the opportunity for success. Although the project addressed all residential providers
contracted with DCFS, there were different populations served within the residential programs.
There are currently 51 private agencies in Illinois with residential performance based contracts
with DCFS, serving approximately 1400 youth. There could be little generalization about
residential programs when discussing performance indicators. Some providers specialize in
treating specific disorders (chronic mental illness, conduct disorder, sexuality issues) and
differing age ranges. Even those that do not “specialize” in the treatment of a specific disorder
may be more successful with certain populations. These challenges made input from
stakeholders extremely important.
Three main goals were established for residential treatment in Illinois:
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1. To improve the safety and stability of children and youth during residential treatment
2. To effectively and efficiently reduce the severity of clinical symptoms and improve the
functional skills of children through residential treatment
3. To improve outcomes for children at and following discharge from residential treatment.
These goals lead to two performance indicators, treatment opportunity days rate and sustained
favorable discharge rate (Kearney et al., 2010, pg. 43)
Treatment opportunity days rate (TODR) measures the number of days that a youth was
in active treatment in residential. In order to be in active treatment, the youth could not be on
runaway status, psychiatrically hospitalized, in detention or a corrections facility. Sustained
favorable discharge rate (SFDR) measures how many times a youth’s treatment is interrupted in
a fiscal year by the aforementioned situations. Also measured are sustained favorable
discharges, the number of youth who successfully complete residential treatment, move to a less
restrictive environment, and remain stable without placement disruption for at least 180 days
(Kearney et al., 2010, p. 44).
As previously stated, residential treatment facilities cannot be generalized, as each
facility has diverse populations and specialties. This was addressed through a risk adjustment
method that took into account factors beyond the provider’s control. It was agreed that the
following risk factors have a statistically significant relationship to the TODR and SFDR:
1. Demographic characteristics of youth (e.g., age, gender, geographic placement of origin)
2. Historical system involvement of youth (e.g., psychiatric hospitalization, detention or
correctional placement, prior residential treatment)
3. Other placement characteristics (e.g., length of residential treatment, placement by
severity level, specialty population, geographic location of the residential placement).
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The risk adjustment is used to calculate expected performance for each facility’s contract based
on their population for that fiscal year. Although there are limitations to this process, as it cannot
account for all possible risk, risk adjustment makes performance measurement more feasible in
an uncontrolled setting (Kearney et al., 2010, p. 47).
Provan, Isett, and Milward examined a community-based network of mostly nonprofit
health and human service organizations, which formed as result of a shift from fee-for-service to
managed care. The results of the study indicated that organizations which banded together,
forming a network, successfully addressed financial pressures of managed care without
compromising service delivery (Provan et al., 2004, p. 506).
Even before the birth of the Striving for Excellence Project, residential treatment
providers in Illinois had formed a network of their own. In the late 1990’s, many private
residential treatment providers in central and southern Illinois began to meet to discuss DCFS
mandates forced upon them through their public contracts. This became known as the
Residential Providers Meeting.
The Residential Providers Meeting is held monthly at a centralized location to allow the
discussion of topics pertinent to residential treatment, such as performance based contracting.
Treatment providers can gain insight on how others tackle obstacles of performance based
contracting and this venue provides an opportunity for private agencies to be heard. Meetings
are often closed to DCFS administration to ensure providers speak freely about their concerns
without fear of backlash. Information from the meetings is reported directly to the appropriate
DCFS administrators for consideration. Many hours of conversation have been held on the topic
of performance based contracting, topics range from the quandaries performance based
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contracting has put private agencies in to how performance based contracting is affecting the
youth in residential treatment.
According to a fact sheet provided by the Child Care Association of Illinois (CCA),
performance based contracting is needed to address the complex behavior challenges and clinical
needs of youth in residential care. CCA also asserts performance contracts provide opportunities
to develop new programming “to provide enhanced clinical treatment, improved stability, and
eased transitions to school, home, and work for kids” and the long term savings from reduced
psychiatric hospitalizations can be reinvested into the programs thus closing any treatment gaps
(http://www.gocwi.org/communications/case_studies/case_studies/CCAI_FactSheet.pdf).
Often times service providers, even when supported by advocacy groups such as the
CCA, view managed care and performance based contracting negatively. When the term
managed care/performance based contracting is mentioned, it normally elicits a negative
response, as it raises concerns regarding the availability and quality of service. For policy
makers and administrators, it may evoke hope for a more efficient use of limited services. Both
responses are common in the field of child welfare, as the current expectation is to do more with
less (Jones, 2006, p.64). According to Jones, “managed care may be the considered the latest
systematic fad to be adopted by some parts of the child welfare field. Managed care assumes the
promise of increased effectiveness of treatment with a minimal input of resources. However,
many have raised serious concerns about its ability to accomplish either effectiveness or
efficiency, within the field of child welfare” (2006, p.65).
Stroul, Pires, Armstrong, and Zaro discuss how over the past several years, there has been
an increase in funding and implementation of community based programming, predominantly in
the public sector, for adolescents with serious emotional disturbances and their families. The
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community based programming, also known as systems of care, offers and emphasizes a broad
range of services, including:
•

a comprehensive range of intensive nonresidential and residential services and
supports

•

treatment in the least restrictive, most appropriate setting

•

individualized and flexible treatment and services

•

interagency collaboration among the various agencies and systems that share
responsibility for children and youth with serious emotional disorders

•

family involvement in planning and delivery of services

•

culturally competent services (2002, p.22).

Stroul et al. go on to discuss how systems of care, similar to residential treatment
facilities in Illinois, are being forced to move from a fee for service payment plan to managed
care as a way to reduce costs. The systems of care and managed care operate under two different
philosophies and Stroul et al. set out to evaluate the impact managed care has had on these
systems of care (2002, p.22).
Through a qualitative case study design, Stroul et al. facilitated data collection through
telephone and on-site interviews. Subjects included stakeholders such as, site directors, key
project staff, families, children’s mental health service providers, representatives of the
behavioral health management care organization (HMCO), case managers, clinicians, and staff
from child welfare, juvenile justice, and educational systems (2002, p. 25).
Stroul et al. concluded that the systems of care philosophy could be preserved in a
managed care setting under certain circumstances. Circumstances such as, the preexistence of a
system-of-care philosophy prior to the integration of managed care; stakeholder involvement in
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managed care planning and implementation; use of a broad array of providers and sufficient
support for case management and care coordination activities; identification and support of
highly utilized groups within the managed care system; and financial compatibility between
managed care and systems of care (2002, p. 33).
There is a push for child welfare and social services to think more like for profit
businesses. Desai and Snavely discuss how non-profit organizations, through government
contracts, are forced to become more cost effective, sometimes resulting in a reduction of
services offered to clients. Performance based contracting and market policies can create a focus
on outcomes rather than best practices, resulting in clients who are statistics in a report rather
than a case with individual needs (2012, p. 17).
Using the residential performance based contract in Illinois as an example, psychiatric
hospitalizations are necessary at times to help stabilize a youth, but under the agency’s contract
with DCFS this is viewed as a negative disruption to treatment. The reality is that
hospitalizations are often times part of treatment, but agencies are now more reluctant to
consider hospitalization as it negatively affects their performance outcomes. This results in
clients not receiving the services they need in return for agencies to receive the funding they
need. Yes, this is a dramatic depiction of how performance based contracting and market
policies challenge the overall philosophy of social services and child welfare.
The question remains, what effect has managed care and performance based contracting
had on child and adolescent residential treatment facilities in Illinois. Based on the previously
mentioned studies, even though managed care is often viewed negatively, especially in child
welfare, the fiscal and service outcomes could be positive, but it can also create many barriers to
success if not carefully implemented.
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Method
Through exploratory research, this case study will discuss some of the effects of
performance based contracting in residential treatment in Illinois. Although the study reveals no
conclusive findings, it is suggestive of effects and suggests avenues for further research.
Information was gathered through both in person and phone interviews with professionals
in the child welfare field. Brice Bloom-Ellis with Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services, who is considered an expert in the area of performance based contracting,
recommended contacting members of the Child Welfare Advisory Committee (CWAC) data test
group. This group is comprised of quality assurance staff with DCFS, private residential agency
administrators, and experts from Northwestern University, the University of Illinois at Chicago,
and Chapin Hall Center for Children. Because this research focuses on the how residential
facilities have been affected, only private agency residential administrators were contacted.
Initial contact was made through email with little success. After several email and phone
call attempts, it was evident that the search for participants needed broadened. Cooperation
increased when the researcher contacted administrators active in the monthly Residential
Provider Meeting.
All participants were employed at private non-profit residential treatment facilities in
Illinois. Currently, all residential treatment facilities in Illinois are affiliated with private
agencies. The nine agencies represented in this study serve varying populations:
•

males and females age 9-21

•

males and females age 12-21 (four agencies)

•

males and females age 12-20

•

males and females age 5-21 (two agencies)
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•

males with sexuality issues age 11-20

The smallest agency serves up to sixteen youth at a time and the largest serves approximately 95.
These agencies are fairly representative of residential treatment facilities across Illinois.
Interviews were conducted both in person and by telephone, two in-person and seven by
telephone. All interviews were voluntary, based on informed consent, and confidentiality. A
form was created, listing all of the interview questions, which allowed the interviewer to easily
take notes. Approval for the interview process was obtained through the Southern Illinois
University Human Subjects Committee prior to the conduction of any interviews. Unfortunately,
the low number of interviews limits the case study, but it provides a basis for future research.
All participants (a clinical director, a treatment director, two treatment supervisors, an executive
director, a chief executive officer, an aftercare coordinator, a manager of residential services,
and a residential coordinator) have direct involvement with their agency’s performance based
contract with DCFS.
The following questions were asked during each interview:
•

When did your agency become involved with performance based contracting with
DCFS?

•

Was this a big change for your agency? If yes, how?

•

What has been the biggest challenge with performance based contracting?

•

Do you think performance based contracting has enhanced your residential
programming?

•

How has performance based contracting affected the services your agency provides?

•

Has performance based contracting affected your budget?
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•

Have you had to hire additional staff for Quality Assurance or Information Technology
for data collection and management?

•

Have you had to diversify your funding sources to compensate for performance based
contracting?

•

Is your agency getting adequately compensated for what DCFS is expecting through
performance based contracting?
Research Findings
All of the participants became involved with residential performance based contracting at

its inception except for one, which became involved approximately one year ago. The main
difference being those agencies which became involved in 2007 were held harmless for the first
year of the contract. Meaning, even though benchmarks and performance measures were set,
agencies were not penalized for failure to meet contract expectations. Those agencies, which
exceeded expectations, did receive incentive money the first year and penalties were imposed
beginning the second year of the project.
The participant whose agency became involved approximately one year ago expressed
both benefits and costs to postponing their involvement with PBC. Having the luxury of learning
from other agencies mistakes was a definite benefit. Additionally, DCFS had assessed and
attempted to make the process more efficient. The obvious downside to later involvement was
not having the one year held harmless. Even though the agency was able to learn from others,
there were still infrastructure and procedural changes that had to be made in order to be
successful, as each agency is run differently.
When asked if performance based contracting was a big change for their agency, only
two participants stated yes. One big change was the contract’s no decline policy. Previous to
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performance based contracting, agencies could more easily decline referrals from DCFS with
little explanation. Through performance based contracting, agencies contract with DCFS for a
certain number of beds per fiscal year and they are paid for those beds if they are filled with
clients or not. For example, an agency’s contract states that sixteen beds will be allocated for
DCFS youth. If only fourteen youth exist in the program, the agency still receives payment for
the sixteen beds, but as soon as DCFS identifies youth in need of residential treatment, it is
expected that those agencies with empty beds will accept them, regardless of the effects on the
milieu.
Some programs may have great success in treating specific disorders, for example post
traumatic stress disorder, but through the no decline policy, DCFS could expect placement of a
youth with borderline personality disorder in the same milieu. Although the administrator knows
the program can treat the youth with borderline personality disorder, it is not a good “fit” for the
program or the other youth. The admission could be disruptive for the milieu, impeding the
progress of other youth, thus negatively affecting performance measures.
In return for the no decline policy, agencies have a guaranteed revenue source with
performance based contracting. For example, one agency’s daily rate of pay per contracted bed
is $263.64. Using the previous example of being contracted for sixteen beds, but only having
fourteen beds occupied is a difference of $527.28 per day. In a thirty-day billing cycle, that is a
difference of $15,818.40! Having a guaranteed revenue source is a definite benefit in any
business, but especially in the non-profit sector. Agencies must decide if the benefit of
guaranteed revenue outweighs the cost of the no decline policy.
Another change was data collection and tracking. For smaller agencies, this was not as
significant, but for an agency with the capacity of 95 residents, the workload drastically
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increased, resulting in acquisition of additional quality assurance and information technology
staff. Larger agencies can more easily absorb the cost of hiring additional staff, but small
agencies were forced to allocate additional work to existing employees.
Participants were asked to identify the main challenge performance based contracting
imposed on their agency. Data collection was identified as one of the main challenges, not only
because of the additional man hours needed to collect and manage the data, but also clearly
understanding what data were needed to meet performance indicators. One participant shared
that upon project inception, performance goals were unclear, but through much discussion with
DCFS and assistance from his peers at the Residential Provider Meeting this is no longer an
issue.
Another identified challenge was insuring clients meet performance indicators. One
performance indicator that created an increased workload is clients’ sustained favorable
discharge. Clients are tracked after their discharge from residential programming to determine if
they are successful in their new placement and agencies are now expected to provide aftercare
services for discharged clients for up to 90 days, depending on the needs of the client. Aftercare,
as identified through performance based contracting and the DCFS Residential Discharge
Protocol, consists of weekly face-to-face visits with the discharged client and ongoing meetings
or staffings that include multiple staff from both the sending and receiving agencies. It is agreed
that increased aftercare improves a youth’s chance for success, but what has not been taken into
consideration is the cost this imposes on agencies.
Most participants agreed that performance based contracting has enhanced their
programming. Although the types of services, other than aftercare, may have stayed the same,
participants felt that services were strengthened. One agency went as far as contracting with
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University of Illinois Chicago to develop their program to increase their effectiveness with youth
who are more challenging, as the no decline policy gave them less control over their admissions.
Other agencies rely on the Residential Provider Meeting to brainstorm among their peers on
ways to strengthen their programs in order to achieve performance measures.
An important aspect of performance based contracting is oversight or monitoring. Prior
to performance based contracting, the Department of Children and Family Services, loosely
monitored contracted agencies. It was rare to see DCFS personnel at private agencies much less
observing the milieu. Performance Based Contracting forced the Department to become more
involved in the service delivery process through monitoring. The Monitoring Division of DCFS
closely scrutinizes residential facilities through unannounced visits to the milieu, active
participation in client staffings, meetings with residential administrators to discuss progress and
barriers to progress, and client file reviews. Most agencies see the Monitoring Division as a tool
to enhance or strengthen their programming, as they provide feedback to providers on ways to
meet performance measures.
Most participants indicated that performance based contracting affected the services their
agency provides. Most generally, participants indicated an increase in aftercare services in order
to meet performance indicators. The performance indicator of sustained favorable discharge
forces agencies to provide post-discharge services for up to 90 days. These services include but
are not limited to weekly therapy sessions, increased case management, follow up staffings, etc.
All participants agreed that performance based contracting has affected their budget. One
participant, whose agency serves approximately 95 youth in their residential program, recently
had to evaluate the increased mileage on their agency vehicles, which were mostly vans. Upon
evaluation, it was determined that the increase was due to the travel to and from weekly aftercare
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visits. In some instances, staff travelled over 200 miles round trip for aftercare visits. One visit
could take up a staff member’s entire day, with four hours being unproductive in a vehicle, not to
mention the financial cost of wear and tear on agency vehicles and the cost of fuel. The agency
resolved to trade in their vans for more economical vehicles in the hopes of a cost reduction.
Of the agencies represented in this study, none of them has diversified their funding
sources to compensate for the costs of performance based contracting, but rather have been more
creative in their use of resources. When asked if their agencies are adequately compensated for
what DCFS is expecting of them through performance based contracting, all participants gave a
resounding no. The consensus is that DCFS is expecting agencies “to do more with less”
resources. Although agencies now receive additional compensation for aftercare services, it is
questionable if the compensation is adequate for the amount of services required. Incentives
were only paid to agencies the first year of implementation. It would be interesting to know if
the perception of performance based contracting is affected by the lack of incentives.
Only two participants reported their agency hired additional staff to assist with the
requirements of performance based contracting. One agency hired an additional quality
assurance staff to track data and the other hired an additional therapist to aid in meeting
performance indicators. All other participants stated any additional tasks created due to
performance based contracting were assigned to existing staff, creating an increased workload.
It seems the overall important effects of performance based contracting include:
•

Budgets – agencies are expected to provide more services without increased funding or
resources

•

Programming – agencies are enhancing their programming to meet performance
measures
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•

Services provided – through performance based contracting, all agencies must provide
aftercare services to youth upon discharge from residential treatment with the hope the
youth will transition smoothly into their new placement. Typically, increased services
create better outcomes.

Although this research is limited to its participants, the researcher speculates the overall
important effects of performance based contracting are common throughout residential providers
in Illinois.
Conclusion
Many of the participants felt that PBC forced them to focus more on statistical outcomes
rather than what is in the best interest of the client, which is contradictory to the philosophy of
child welfare. This topic warrants further discussion, as this creates a division between private
providers and DCFS. Further research into how agencies can be more cost effective, while
preserving the foundation of child welfare is imperative. Desai and Snavely speculate, the trend
will continue toward “the integration of market-oriented management with social purpose
organizational goals” (2012, p. 1).
During one of the interviews, a participant stated, “although each agency’s contract is
risk adjusted, some necessary adjustments have not been considered. For example, females are
four times more likely to have incidents that could result in placement disruption.” When
creating contracts and adjusting for risk, are agencies adjusting appropriately for risk and how
can agencies be more individualized in their contracts. Yes, the current risk adjustment model
considers several factors, but are the most significant factors accounted for? This will require
ongoing research and discussion between private agencies and DCFS.
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Performance based contracting has definite benefits and costs that agencies must weigh
when determining their involvement with government entities. Unfortunately, for the agencies
involved in this research except for one, performance based contracting was forced upon them,
as they had existing contracts with DCFS and performance indicators were added to their
existing contracts. Through the interviews, it seems that initially performance based contracting
was viewed negatively, but surprisingly over time, agencies have experienced benefits from the
process. In sum, performance based contracting has negative fiscal affects especially when
financial incentives are discontinued, but it is credited to strengthening residential programs.
However, it is still questionable if the benefits outweigh the costs.
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